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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
HEBER W. GLENN,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

vs.

J.

(

A. FERRELL, et al,

No. 8523

)

Defendant and Respondent.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF FACTS
From the 5th day of October, 1951, to 1vlay 6, 1952, the
Appellant performed vvork on a farn1 in Utah County ovvned
by the Respondent in grading and leveling of said property
(R-10). In the spring of 1952, the farm was sold by the
Respondent, who then moved to l\1ontana. Suit was commenced
by the Appellant to recover $2, 176.65, being the reasonable
value of the work performed, and had a summons served upon
the Respondent at Hardin, Montana (R- 5). A motion to
quash service of summons was filed by the Respondent on the
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grounds that he was at that time a non-resident of the State
of Utah (R-12). The motion was granted and thereafter the
Appellant procured an order for publication of summons or,
in the alternative, personal service on the Respondent as specified in Rule 4 (f) 2 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
(R-9), based upon an affidavit which, in addition to stating
that the Respondent was not a resident of the State of Utah,
advised the court that there was property within the State of
Utah subject to attachment and (tthat it is the intention of the
Plaintiff to attach said property and to proceed quasi in rem"
(R-7). After securing such order, the Respondent was again
personally served with a summons in the action (R-6).
Suit was also commenced against Sugarhouse Stake for
the purpose of foreclosing a mechanic's lien against the property, but this action was dismissed (R-23), leaving the Appellant, as his only remedy, his claim against the Respondent
through his property in the jurisdiction of the State of Utah.
At the time of the sale of the farm to Sugarhouse Stake,
the Respondent deposited Certificate No. 33, being a certificate
of water stock issued by Utah Lake Distributing Company,
which was not in the name of the Respondent, but rather had
been endorsed in blank by a previous owner. The certificate
represented 300 shares, and the Respondent was only selling
198 shares with the farm to the Sugarhouse Stake. A writ of
attachment was procured and left with the Salt Lake County
Sheriff, who levied the writ of attachment on the Certificate
No. 33, claiming only to have attached 102 of the 300 shares
as being the p~operty of the Respondent and recognizing the
ownership of Sugarhouse Stake to the other 198 shares (R-15).
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fhe· default of the· Responde1;1t _was el].te.red on the 9th day
of October, 1953 (R-16) and a judgment by default was
procured. I-Iowever, it was limited to such recovery as the
Appellant might secure from the property of the Respondent
heretofore attached and within the jurisdiction of the court
(R-17). A writ of execution was issued on the 3rd day of
December, 195 3, directing the sheriff to levy against the property of the Respondent attached in the above entitled action
(R-18).
Prior to the sheriff's sale, the original certificate No. 33
for 300 shares had been surrendered to the Utah Lake Distributing Company, with the consent of the Appellant, and
new certificates had been issued, one to the Sugarhouse Stake
and the balance for 102 shares returned to the sheriff, subject
to the attachment. On the 31st day of March, 1955, the sheriff
proceeded to sell the certificate for 102 shares and the Appellant was the high bidder and procured from the sheriff the
certificate of stock pursuant to said sale. The return of the
sheriff's sale was made on the 1st day of April, 1955 (R-19).
On the 26th day of January, 1956, the Respondent filed a
motion to vacate the attachment, judgment and judicial sale
on the ground that the stock had not been properly levied upon
pursuant to the writ of attachment and in compliance with
Rule 64 C (e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (R-22).
Although the sheriff had complied with the provisions of
Section 16-3-13, U.C.A., 1953, being the provisions of the
Uniform Stock Transfer Act, the court granted the motion of
the Respondent and held that the attachment was not served
in accordance with the statute and was therefore null and void
(R-24). The appeal raises the sole issue of "'hether compliance
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with Section 16-3-13, U.C.A., 1953, was a sufficient levy of
the writ of attachment.
ARGUMENT
POINT ONE. STOCK OF A CORPORATION IS VALIDLY ATTACHED BY THE SHERIFF LEVYING UPON
THE CERTIFICATE IN COMPLIANCE WITH SECTION
16-3-13 U.C.A., 1953 (SECTION 13, UNIFORM STOCK
TRANSFER ACT.)
The issue_ involved requires a consideration of two provisions of Utah statutory law. Rules 64 C( e) of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure pertaining to the manner of executing
writs of attachment advises as follows:
Stocks or shares, or interest in stocks or shares, of
any corporation or company may be attached by leaving
with the president, secretary, or cashier or other managing agent thereof, a copy of thewrit, and a notice stating
that the stock or interest of the defendant is attached
in pursuance of such writ and by taking the certificate
into custody, unless the transfer thereof by the holder
is enjoined or unless it is surrendered to the corporation
issuing it."
Section 16-3-13, U.C.A., 1953, being a part of the Uniform
Stock Transfer Act, specifies with reference to the attachment
of stock as follows:
t t

((Attachment or levy-Necessity of seizure of certificate-Right to New Certificate. No attachment or
levy upon shares of stock for which a certificate is outstanding shall be valid until such certificate be actually
seized by the officer making the attachment or levy, or
be surrendered to the corporation which issued it, or its
transfer by the holder be enjoined. Except where a

6
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

certificate is lost or destroyed, such corporation ·shall
not be compelled to issue a new certificate for the stock
until the old certificate is surrendered to it."
The stock certificate in this particular case was not in the
name of the Respondent, but rather had been endorsed in
blank and was considered to be street stock or a negotiable
instrument. The sheriff did not serve a copy of the writ of attachment on the officers of the corporation as specified by the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure; however, the writ of attachment was levied upon the certificate as provided by Section
16-3-13. The issue presented, therefore, is whether compliance
with Section 16-3-13 is sufficient as a valid attachment of the
stock certificate.
Before discussing the particular point 1n question, 1t 1s
felt that a brief reference to the legislative history and the
common law prior to the adoption of the Uniform Stock
Transfer Act would be helpful. At common law, certificates of
stock v1ere only evidence of a proportionate ownership in the
corporation. As such, they were not considered property, nor
were they accorded the dignity of negotiable instruments ( 4
Am. Jur. 776, Attachment and Garnishment, Section 351).
Consequently, it was necessary to levy an attachment by serving
the same upon the corporation just the same as if an attachment were to be levied upon an undivided interest in the
property. The requirements contained in the Rules of Civil
Procedure date back to the laws of the Territory of Utah,
1851-70, Section 127. At or about the time of the promulgation
of the Uniform Stock Transfer Act, it was felt that commercial
interests required that certificates of stock be treated as property and be made freely negotiable. Section 16-2-34, U.C.A.,
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1953,_ pr?vides that shar~.s .of stock are per~nal property; and
in 1927 Utah adopted the Uniform Stock Transfer Act, which
is now Section 16-3 U.C.A., 1953. The Uniform Stock Transfer
Act made specific requirements which would make stock
certificates negotiable instruments. Actual possession of the
certificate became of paramount importance. An assignment of
a stock certificate without delivery of the same was held to be
ineffective as against bona fide purchasers or other persons
who actually secured possession of the certificate itself. Consequently, it was necessary for the purpose of levying a valid
attachment that the certificate actually be attached and held.
In Hodes vs. Hodes, 15 5 Pac. 2d 564, 176. Or. 102, the
above distinction was discussed as follows:
"At common law, shares of stock of a corporation
were not subject to levy or attachment. 6 C.J.S., Attachment, Section 395, page 212; 7 C.J.S., Attachment, Section 79; Mills v. Jacobs, 333 Pa. 231, 4 A. 2d 152, 122
A.L.R. 333; Elgart vs. Mintz, 123 N.J. Eq. 404, 197
A. 747. Legislation to enable creditors to reach this
type of property has been enacted in most jurisdictions,
by virtue of which shares of stock in incorporated companies may be attached. 7 C.J.S., Attachment, Section
79, Page 253. * * *
"The essential factors of the uniform stock transfer
act have been adopted in thirty-six states and the Territory of Alaska. 6 U.L.A. 43, Page 6. The main purpose
of that act is to make certificates of stock (as far as
possible, the sole representative of the shares which they
represent'. Mills vs. Jacobs, supra. (333 Pa. 231, 4 A.
2d 154); 6 U.L.A. 2, Commissioner's note. By Section
1 of the uniform stock transfer act (Section 78-101,
O.C.L.A.), a transfer· of a stock certificate is made to
operate as a transfer of the shares represented thereby,
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without regard to . the transfer on the books· of the
company. (Citation of authorities.)"
Section 1 of the Uniform Stock Transfer Act, being Section
16-3-1 U.C.A., 1953, specifies: ttTitle to a certificate and to the
shares represented thereby can be transferred only by delivery
of the certificate properly endorse.d or by delivery of the certificate with a power of attorney, and said section then provides:
((The provisions of this act shall be applicable althrough the charter or articles of incorporation or code
or regulations or bylaws of the corporation issuing the
certificate and the certificate itself provide that the
shares represented thereby shall be transferable only
on the books of the corporation or be registered by a
registrar or transferred by a transfer agent."
Since the certificate attached by the sheriff in this case was
not issued in the name of the Respondent, the serving of a
writ of attachment to an officer of the corporation would not
have reached any property shown to have been owned by the
Respondent. The only basis upon which the Appellant could
validly reach the interest of the Respondent in the negotiable
stock certificates was to levy upon the certificate itself, which
was accomplished by the sheriff in compliance with the stock
transfer act.
We have only been able to find one case which presented
the problem of a conflict between the old type attachment provisions and the provisions of the Uniform Stock Transfer Act.
Such a problem was presented in Nevael Investment Cortnration vs. Schrunk, 279 P. 2d 518, 203 Or. 268, decided
February 2, 1955.
Section 78-113 O.C.L.A. of the Oregon law is the same
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provision as Section ·16-3-13 u·.c~A~ 195 3, more· particularly the
provision of the Uniform Stock Transfer Act. Section 7-206
O.C.L.A. is the Oregon counterpart of Rule 64 C( e) 5 of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Part of Section 7-206 O.C.L.A.
1s as follows:
''Other personal property shall be attached by leaving
a certified copy of the writ, and a notice specifying the
property attached, with the person having the possession of the same, or if it be a debt, then with the debtor,
or if it be rights or shares in the stock of an association
or corporation} or interests or profits thereon_. tben with
such person or officer of such association or corporation as this code authorizes a summons to be served
upon/ * * * (Emphasis added.)
In the above mentioned case, suit was brought against
the sheriff who had attached certificates of stock being held
in escrow, but had failed to serve a copy of the writ upon an
officer of the corporation. The issue before the court was the
validity of the attachment. It was there argued, as in this case,
that since the sheriff had not complied with the specific rules
on attachment and had only complied with the section of the
Uniform Stock Transfer Act, there had not been a valid attachment. The comment of the Court concerning this problem
is as follows:
{(Plaintiff first claims that the attachment was ineffective because service of garnishtnent was not made
on the officers of the West Coast Burner & Furnace
Con1pany in compliance with Section 7-206, O.C.L.A.,
ORS 29.170. The Uniform Stock Transfer Act, Section
78-113, O.C.L.A., ORS 58.130, sets out the procedure
for attachment where corporate stock is involved. Refering to the above section Mr. Justice Bailey, speaking
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for the court in Hodes vs. Hodes, 176 Or. 102, 155 P.
2d 564, 566, had this to say:
''Whether or not the plaintiff's shares of stock are
subject to attachment and sale on execution is governed by Section 78-113, O.C.L.A. (Section 13 of
the uniform stock transfer act), * * * *
'Three alternative means are specified in the section last quoted for making effective on attachment
or levy on stock, to wit: ( 1) by actual seizure of the
certificate; ( 2) by surrender of the certificate to the
corporation which issued it; and ( 3) by enjoining
the holder from transferring it. * * *'
( 1) Since the stock was seized by the sheriff under
the attachment it was unnecessary to give notice to the
West Coast Burner & Furnace Company."
It is evident that the Oregon Court did not consider the
two requirements as being cumulative but rather compliance
with the provisions of the Stock Transfer Act was sufficient.
Further, the Court held that a purported assignment of the
stock prior to the levy of the writ of attachment only operated
as a promise to transfer and that without actual delivery of
the stock certificate, the attaching creditor stood in the position
of a bona fide purchaser and the attachment was sufficient to
cut off the rights of the purported assignee.
Under the circumstances of the case now before the court,
it would be requiring a futile act to hold that it would be
necessary to serve the writ of attachment on the corporation.
No stock appeared in the name of the Respondent on the
records of the corporation, and consequently there vvould be
no evidence as far as the records of the corporation are concerned of any ownership in the Respondent subject to attachment. The corporation under the Uniform Stock Transfer Act
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could not transfer any shares- without actual· receipt of the
certificates. Since these had been attached, there was no danger
of such a transfer or injury to any other person. The certificate
was in one county and the office of the corporation v1as in
another county. To give effect to both statutes would require
the issuance of a second .writ of attachment and the service
of the same, all of which would appear unnecessary since the
actual stock certificate had been attached.
In view of the Oregon case, the purpose and intent of
the Uniform Stock Transfer Act, and the legislative history of
the two sections, it would appear that the Appellant should
not be defeated in this matter by the claims of a non-resident
seeking to escape liability on legal technicalities. Especially
is this true in view of Rule 61 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure wherein it states:
UNo error in either the admission or the exclusion
of evidence, and no error or defect in any ruling or
order or in anything done or omitted by the court or
by any of the parties, is ground for granting a new trial
or otherwise disturbing a judgment or order, unless
refusal to take such action appears to the court inconsistent with substantial justice. The court at every stage
of the proceeding must disregard any error or defect
in the proceeding which does not affect the substantial
rights of the parties."
If there has been eny error, at most it was a harmless error
which should be disregarded in compliance with the foregoing
rule. There has been no affidavit of merits or clain1 that the
complaint of the Appellant is not valid or justified. The Respondent and his counsel knew of the proceedings taking place
in the above mentioned court and were advised of the contem-
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plated sheriff's sale of the certificate in question. Under the
circumstances, it would appear unfair and inequitable to permit
the Respondent to escape his liability after approximately three
years' delay on the basis that a useless act had not been performed by the sheriff.
It is respectfully submitted that this court should hold that
stock of a corporation is validly attached by the sheriff levying
upon the certificate in compliance with Section 16-3~13 U.C.A.,
1953, and therefore the judgment of the trial court be reversed.
RALPH & BUSHNELL
By -Dan S. Bushnell

Attorneys for Appellant.
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